The Chairperson of the National Advisory Council (NAC), Sonia Gandhi, laid the foundation stone for the strategic 8.8 kilometer-long Rohtang Tunnel, to be built at an altitude of over 3,000 meters in the Pir Panjal range, which will enable all-weather road access across the Rohtang Pass at a height of 3,978 mts.

Simultaneous drilling commenced on Monday at the South Portal, 15 kilometers from Manali, in Himachal Pradesh as well as at the North Portal, joining the Manali-Sarchu road over the Chandra river.

The tunnel will provide unhindered road access to the remote regions of Lahaul and Spiti, and Pangi Valley in Himachal Pradesh throughout the year, as well cutting the travel distance by almost 48 kilometers or four hours. It will also facilitate an alternate and assured access to the Ladakh region in the event of a closure of National Highway 1D, which connects Srinagar to Leh in Ladakh, due to bad weather or, as happening during the Kargil conflict, because of shelling from the Pakistani side of the Line of Control.

The horse-shoe shaped tunnel will be a two-way lane in a single tube, 11.25 meters wide and will incorporate a semi-transverse ventilation system, where large fans would separately circulate air in and out, through the tunnel length and to reduce vehicular fumes.

The tunnel is being constructed at an expenditure of US $ 3.2 billion under the aegis of the Border Roads Organization (BRO) by Strabag-Afcons (a joint venture between India’s Afcons Infrastructure Ltd and Strabag SE of Austria, the world’s fourth largest construction company) and is expected to be completed in 63 months, by February 2015.

The project also includes the construction of 292 kilometer-long all-weather road through Nimu-Padam-Darcha via Shinkunla Pass, traversing the remote Zanskar region of Jammu and Kashmir, at an additional estimated cost of US $ 600 million. This will ensure the two other snow-bound passes, Baralacha La and Thaglang La, do not prevent the Manali-Keylong-Leh highway from becoming an all-weather road.

Other officials present at the commencement of drilling included Union Defense Minister, AK Antony, Union Steel Minister, Vir Bhadra Singh, Himachal Pradesh Chief Minister, Prem Kumar Dhumal, Minister of State for Defense, Dr MM Pallam Raju, Defense Secretary, Pradeep Kumar and Director General Border Roads Organization (BRO), Lt Gen MC Badhani.

Incidentally, scientists at Panjab University and the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research had once proposed the installation of a neutrino detector inside the Rohtang Tunnel.

The annual report released by the Indian Ministry of Defense for the year 2009-’10, in which it has expressed its ‘concern with the worsening security situation in Pakistan’, has published figures on terrorist infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir that appear considerably more conservative in comparison to the assessments made by the state police and the Ministry of Home Affairs, India’s internal security ministry.

Although the ministry quoted from the report, in a statement released late on Monday entitled India Expresses Concern Over Continuing Infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir, saying, “The continued infiltrations across the LoC (Line of Control) and the existence of terrorist camps across the India-Pak border (however), demonstrate the continuing ambivalence of Pakistan in its actions against terrorist organizations,” it also said, “All parameters of proxy war are at an all time low and the current situation indicated a shift towards normalcy and peace… the ceasefire on the borders / LoC is holding out with a few minor aberrations.”

The ministry report said that during the period between April 01, 2009 to February 28, 2010, 213 terrorists were killed and 68 apprehended in encounters with the Armed Forces. Interestingly, the report also cites 33 infiltration bids with 50 dead terrorists in the same period, a figure that appears substantially more sober in comparison to the figures attributed to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Jammu and Kashmir State Police.

A report entitled Jammu and Kashmir Assessment – Year 2010, compiled by the New Delhi-based Institute for Conflict Management-run South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) says, “The MHA’s year-end review (data till November) stated that, during 2009, 473 infiltration bids were attempted, out of which 367 were foiled. According to infiltration figures compiled by the Multi-Agency Center (MAC), the nodal agency for all terrorism-related intelligence under the Union Home Ministry, while 93 terrorists were intercepted and neutralized during the 473 infiltration attempts, and 227 retreated into Pakistan on being intercepted, 110 terrorists managed to give the border forces a slip.”

The SATP report also says the Jammu and Kashmir Director General of Police put the infiltration-bid figure at 433, up by 91 from 2008. “According to J&K Police figures 342 infiltration attempts were made from across the border in 2008, while 2007 and 2006 reported 535 and 573 such attempts respectively along the LoC and International Border (IB) in J&K,” says the SATP in its report, also adding, “Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor, on January 14, said the infiltration level had increased, with 110 terrorists managing to sneak in, till November, in 2009, as compared to 57 in 2008.”

The Israeli government has issued a highly significant advisory warning of high-profile terror strikes in India.

The advisory recommends that Israelis refrain from visiting places known to be frequented by westerners and Israelis and places without visible armed security, and also urges Israelis to avoid visiting the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The warning has been issued by the Israeli Counter Terrorism Bureau (CTB), which is part of the National Security Council.

The CTB has four levels of threat perception. The lowest signifies a Continuous Potential Threat or Opportunity for a terror strike. The next highest is the Basic Concrete Threat under which the CTB recommends that Israeli citizens refrain from visiting the country or region in question. The second highest is the High Concrete Threat under which the CTB recommends for Israeli citizens to avoid visiting the designated region or country and leave as soon as possible if already present.

The Very High Concrete Threat, issued in this instance, is above all of the above and is issued by the CTB to urge all Israeli citizens to leave the host country ‘immediately’.

According to sources, the threat perception was arrived at by the CTB after communication was intercepted that indicated an imminent terror strike. But since the Israelis have not been able to identify the specific group planning the strike or the possible targets in question, the information has been revealed and the threat perception disclosed to try preempt any such strike.

Interestingly, the announcement of the threat perception also comes on Friday, when the Jewish holiday Rosh Hashanah begins at sunset and continues till Sunday night.

Also read

Israel has much to learn from 26/11 says former Mossad operative

US issues ‘urgent’ terror warning to citizens in India

Terror attack threat on India heightened

The Pakistan Army has violated the ceasefire across the Line of Control that has been in effect since 2003 for the second time in a month.

Pakistani forces fired seven to ten rounds of small arms gunfire in the Poonch-Rajouri area near Saujian and Kopra at 1045 hrs today. No casualties are reported.

This comes after Pakistani forces violated the ceasefire on May 9, firing mortars at Indian positions on the Line of Control.

Indian troops did not retaliate to the ceasefire violation. Sources in the Indian Army told StratPost, “This is the sort of thing that they do when they want to facilitate infiltration of terrorists into the state. They start firing when they want to divert attention or to provoke a retaliation from our troops so they can figure out the positions of the patrols. It’s a probing tactic.”

There has been discussion of the relative success or failure of US Information Operations in the Af-Pak region recently. Your correspondent sat with a senior Information Operations expert at the Indian Ministry of Defense, who explained the concept and the way ahead for the US.

“The first recorded use of Information Warfare that I can recall is from the Mahabharata (Hindu religious epic). Ashwatthama, the son of the commander of the Kaurava army Dronacharya was said by Yudhishthira to have been killed, when instead it was an elephant of the same name that died. Upon hearing this, Drona laid down his weapons and was killed by Dhrishtadhyuna, the son of his mortal enemy.

Information warfare requires credible information, a credible source and a clear medium. The information was that of Ashwatthama’s death, which was possible and credible and while, in itself, was not such a great blow, led to the killing of Dronacharya, the army commander. The source was Yudhishthira, renowned for his truthfulness and adherence to righteousness,” he explains.

“Fast-forward to Mao. His methods of Information Warfare came to be known as Propaganda. Now to make it more palatable and subtle the concept was renamed Psychological Operations (PsyOps) and then Perception Management,” he rattles off the terms. Smiling, he says, “Now we call the exercise ‘Shaping the Information Environment’ or simply Information Operations. Information Operations is a larger concept of which Information Warfare is a subset.”

Elaborating further, he warms up, “Information Operations depend upon several factors. The geographical reference, defined population/audience, religion, socio-economic and political aspects and taboos. These factors are understood by population terrain mapping, which is really an analysis of a people and their environment. So what becomes important for conducting an Information Operation are circles of influence on a population, which could include mediums of transmission of information, family, society, religion, leadership and village elders. This list is not exhaustive.”

“Next, one also has to figure out the kinds of media available to oneself to transmit one’s message. It could range from a leaflet to a mobile phone. The purpose of the operation has to be subtle information dominance, even though this sort of perception management can take a generation to bear fruit,” he warns.

He prescribes the message, “To do this effectively, one has to play on themes that are relevant to a population. There has to be message customization to meet local aspirations. The idea has to be to achieve a shift in attitudes from inimical to neutral to favorable. When the last is achieved, that’s when one can establish a partnership for progress in meeting aspirations.”

“And what would those aspirations be in Af-Pak? Safety, security and a better future for families and children. Those are the obvious basic things that everyone wants.”

The brasshat then looks at the US approach, opining, “The US has so far relied more on kinetic means of victory. Guns, bullets, drones, bombs and airstrikes – that sort of thing. They have to move towards softer means of success. They have not managed to convince the population of their sincerity and their interest in stabilizing the region and creating an environment where the population’s future is secure. Their dominance has to come from sincere measures for protecting the people. Otherwise, even though the Taliban may be on the run, they still evoke fear in people, which means they still dominate the population. Their message to the population is ‘If you collaborate with the US, we’ll come back and get you when they leave’.”

“And that is the challenge here,” he goes on, “The Taliban have a natural advantage, in that, many of them come from the local population, speak the language, know their ways and know how to exploit these factors. The whipping of a girl is captured on a mobile phone and the video, when circulated creates terror. That is how they dominate the mainstream. By force.”

The senior officer explains the counter for this, saying, “The US has to transmit an effective message that they are here to stay till the local population can defend itself. These messages need to be tailored very carefully for maximum impact, understanding and acceptance.”

“Look at us. We have the right to claim the best operational conduct in the world, both in terms of Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN Ops) as well as in terms of Information Operations. Nobody can deny that the people of Jammu and Kashmir know that we are here to stay. This message goes down especially well also because we have not been indiscriminate in the conduct of COIN Ops in Jammu and Kashmir. And it has taken us decades, but at least now it can be safely said that the majority of the population is neutral towards us. Now it is actually time to convince them and those across the border too of our strengths.”

The army has reported the killing of two terrorists belonging to the Lashkar e Toiba (LeT) in Bhadarwa in Doda in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The operation was carried out by a unit of the Rashtriya Rifles and while combing operations are still on, there are not expected to be more terrorists. The Rashtriya Rifles unit did not sustain any casualties during the operation, which was initiated on the basis of ‘hard intelligence’ received by security forces.

The Indian Army has now moved to pin responsibility for the firing in Bomai in Sopore in Jammu and Kashmir that killed two people on February 21. One Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) and two Other Ranks (ORs) have been charged over the incident at the end of the Court of Inquiry. The Court of Inquiry was conducted by an officer of the rank of Brigadier of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps.

Army sources told StratPost, “The JCO has been charged with not exercising adequate command and control and the jawans have been charged with not exercising restraint over their weapons.”

The General Officer Commanding, Kilo Force will be convening disciplinary proceedings against the three personnel, which could later result in them being cashiered from the army and even imprisoned.

The three soldiers belong to 22 Rashtriya Rifles, a unit which has received the Unit Citation both in 2000 as well as 2009.

Under the Karachi agreement the border extended to a point known as NJ9842 'and thence north to the glaciers'. Map courtesy: http://www.flickr.com/photos/amapple/2561626234

The issue that dominates the peace process pursued by the Indian and Pakistani governments on Kashmir since 2004 is about the control of the Siachen Glacier in the region, the world’s highest battlefield. Although a ceasefire has been in place since 2003, thousands of troops on both sides continue to eyeball each other across the extreme terrain. The Indian Army dominates the glaciers, occupying the high ground on the Saltoro ridge on the western edge of the glacier, restricting Pakistani forces to lower positions. The environme

nt at the glacier is so harsh as to be snow and ice-bound through the year with forces necessarily stationed at the highest possible altitudes where temperatures drop 50 degrees Celsius below zero. In fact most of the several thousand casualties on both sides are victims of the unforgiving terrain and climate.

Even though both neighbours are in agreement on the importance of demilitarization of the glacier, they remain at loggerheads on the formula for demilitarization. New Delhi wants Pakistan to authenticate currently held positions on the Saltoro Ridge as a recognised acknowledgment of territory controlled and a guarantee against any future invasion, something the latter refuses to acquiesce to. The ghosts of the thousand of lives lost in the battles over the glacier and against the elements also contribute to hardened stands and prevent a compromise.

But this demilitarization is vital for a stable relationship between India and Pakistan even such a step also brings great risks. And although standing away from this dispute the United States stands to benefit indirectly from any compromise over Siachen.

The Dispute in Question

The uninhabited glacier became a point of conflict between the two countries only in the 1980s, when fearing its occupation by the other, both countries raced to take control in April 1984. The Indian Army won this race and managed to take key positions on the Saltoro Ridge while Pakistani forces were kept at bay at lower positions. Both armies set up stations at altitudes of 9,000 to 22,000 ft and have suffered 3,500-5,000 casualties since, continuing this face-off undeterred to this day.

The genesis of the dispute over Siachen is the 1948 Karachi ceasefire agreement, which ended India’s first war with Pakistan over Kashmir after Pakistan sent over irregulars to prevent Jammu and Kashmir from acceding and joining the Union of India. An ambiguity in the agreement relates to the Line of Control (LoC) that came up in place of the International Border, with Pakistan occupying part of Jammu and Kashmir, now known as Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK). This agreement failed to clearly demarcate the dividing line between Pakistan and India in the north in Jammu and Kashmir, only saying it would continue “thence north to the glaciers.” Now India interprets this to mean the LoC proceeds strictly northward placing the glacier decisively within the Indian frontier. But Pakistan says the line runs northeast to the Karakoram Pass putting the glacier within the area occupied by it.

The yellow line is the Line of Control. The red lines are the International Border. The area in the north between the two red lines was illegally ceded by Pakistan to China.

The five-year-old ceasefire in effect on the glacier has reinforced hopes for a permanent settlement, encouraging proponents of demilitarization about the potential of a top-down conflict resolution framework in facilitating a resolution of the Kashmir dispute. But repeated talks until April 2007 have so far had no result.

The basic disagreement over Siachen is the question of authentication and acceptance of the current ceasefire line there, the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL). The historical mistrust and the fear of irreversible negative consequences in future have lead to this standoff at the negotiating table. India’s diplomacy over Siachen is based simply on the old US Cold War rule of thumb – trust, but verify, and seeks Pakistani authentication of its positions to prevent future incursions. Such authentication would make apparent the violation of the de facto international border to the international community in case of attempts to change the status quo.

It is no surprise the Indian Army has been consistently in its opposition to any agreement failing to authenticate, basing its argument on the virtual impossibility of retaking positions were Pakistan to renege on its word and occupy the glacier, including vacated Indian positions. Military experts are divided over the strategic value of the glacier, with some arguing the futility of combat in such an inhospitable environment in an area that they concede has no strategic value. Were India to withdraw from the glacier, in their view Pakistan would follow suit.

But there are others who consider Siachen crucial territory as it wedges between PoK and the Aksai Chin and constitutes India’s northernmost frontier with Pakistan and China. And since India has fought wars with both countries the threat of Pakistan and China to Ladakh and Kargil in northern Kashmir is not impossible to perceive. The Siachen glacier is also the fount for the Nubra River that flows into Indian territory.

But Pakistan continues to refuse authentication thinking India might use this as the basis of a legal claim on the glacier. The opinion in Islamabad is that such a step would also compromise Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir issue as a whole giving India a way to claim the glacier as well as consolidate its control over the Kashmir valley. As it is, the Siachen glacier tourism programme initiated by the Indian Army was not taken well by Pakistan, which took the step as a claim of sovereignty over the glacier.

Authentication would also imply the Pakistani Army’s position on the glacier is not one of strength and may hurt the Army’s morale and prestige, something Islamabad would not to admit to its own people. This would be unthinkable at a time when the people are beginning to rally behind the Army in Pakistan’s confrontation with India over the Mumbai attacks on November 26 this year.

Trust at a premium

So how do the two neighbours sort this out? There are two kinds of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Low-risk CBMs such as the setting up of establishment of passenger and cargo transportation links are easier to implement because the negative consequences of one side reneging on the deal can be dealt with (The other side simply ends the links). But CBMs such as demilitarizing Siachen are high-risk, since perfidy by one side could mean loss of territory for the other and be disastrous in terms of the actual security implications as well as the inevitable domestic upheavals that would follow. That is why there have to be greater incentives for both sides to cooperate with some degree of sincerity, like means of verification that are acceptable to both sides. Even with 26/11 in mind, there has been a general recognition in both India and Pakistan of the need to sort out issues that could give rise to military confrontation. CBMs like the Nuclear Risk Reduction Agreement of February 2007 are one example.

So if it comes down to a means of verification that both countries can trust, satellite technology can be of service to some degree. A satellite reconnaissance system that which would detect breaches of trust and agreement by either side may deter covert military intrusions. But nevertheless, if one side did manage to occupy the glacier again, dislodging it would be extremely difficult. Even in 1984, the Indian Army took the heights in the absence of Pakistani troops on Saltoro Ridge. Maintenance of control over current positions on the glacier is difficult enough — recapturing positions once lost would be even tougher.

While US foreign policy objectives of decreasing tensions between its allies India and Pakistan would be served by a settlement on Siachen, the Bush administration has not focused on it in terms of public statements or private pressure on both sides for what could be several reasons.

Even though the subcontinent has been an area of concern to the US because of terrorism and the Indo-US nuclear agreement, the administration has been distracted by more pressing apprehensions from Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea.

Also, knowing that any public pronouncements would stir up domestic opposition in both countries to any perceived concessions that may be part of the deal, the US has so far kept quiet on the issue. This is because both countries have constituencies that resent perceived US interference in what they consider their own affairs. Pakistan has a long list of resentments against the US. US pressure to crack down on militant networks, the US desire to directly interview nuclear salesman and Pakistani scientist A Q Khan, moves to declare prominent former Pakistanis including Lt General Hamid Gul, the former Director General of the Pakistani intelligence agency, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), and now again pressure to crack down on terrorism directed at India.

India too has elements opposed to Indian engagement with the US, notably the communist parties and old Cold Warriors who opposed the nuclear agreement as well as joint military exercises with the US and the nationalist right wing Bharatiya Janata Party, the main opposition party who’s resistance to the nuclear agreement was perceived to be purely a result of opposition politics, but which has in the past opposed entry of western big business into India.

So any initiative taken by India on this front with US involvement would have its detractors. Although, the sputtering security cooperation between India and the US (and other countries as well) in the aftermath of 26/11 may go some way in changing perceptions, attitudes and relative opposition to security engagements with the US.

Also, since India and Pakistan have been talking about a resolution of the Siachen issue anyway, the US would find itself hard-pressed to give a reason for pushing both countries to talk about it.

But the US could play a role in the implementation of any resolution, subject to agreement by both sides. The US could conceivably provide neutral satellite reconnaissance facilities to monitor continued implementation of an agreement. Needless to say this would first require overcoming of the trust deficit by both sides to make a deal.

To top up this deficit, the two sides could come together and agree on a different but related issue. One issue that could be an example of this would be joint work on the degrading environment on the glacier. Recent studies have shown Himalayan glaciers to have been shrinking at the alarming rate of as much as 20% between 1962 and 2001.

There was a recent proposal for both countries to work together to clean up the glacier which has accumulated a large amount of waste over the years. The aim is to transform the Siachen area into a “mountain of peace.” Non-governmental groups have argued for a “Siachen Peace Park” to check the degradation of the glacier, while the Indian Army has initiated clean-up moves under the “Green-Siachen Clean Siachen” plan. Such moves could go a long way in reducing mistrust between the two countries and act as a vehicle for meaningful moves towards a settlement on the Kashmir dispute.

But ideas like these for cooperation on environmental protection can work out only if there are also moves to demilitarize the glacier. Failing which, Siachen will remain a victim of the trust deficit between the two countries, as a CBM.

The yellow line is the Line of Control. The red lines are the International Border. The area in the north between the two red lines was illegally seceded by Pakistan to China.

Dr. Sharad Joshi is a Research Associate at the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. Previously, he was a postdoctoral fellow at the James Martine Center for Nonproliferation Studies from Sept. 2006 to Oct. 2008. He holds a PhD from the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. His research focuses on security issues in South Asia, especially nuclear proliferation and terrorism.