People protesting the US presence in Afghanistan have swamped the White House Facebook page, in an attempt to influence President Obama’s State of the Union address. This is a result of a petition by a group called Rethink Afghanistan which has launched a petition.

The statement, repeat posted on the page by the protesters, says, ” President Obama, I, and more than 20,000 voters signed of this petition from Rethink Afghanistan: ‘In your State of the Union address on January 27, 2010, I will listen for a concrete exit strategy for our troops in Afghanistan that begins no later than July 2011 and which completes a withdrawal of combat troops no later than July 1, 2012.’ ”

Istanbul and London are seeing conferences this week that have something like this as their agenda.

The circumstances of these two conferences have exposed the position of relative weakness in which the US-led alliance in Afghanistan is placed.

The declaration of the beginning of a withdrawal from 2011, the ad hoc surge of troops, the lack of success in jury-rigging a semblance of governance in Afghanistan, the continued absence of a half-way reliable trained army and police and the inability to do anything about the reluctance of Pakistan to combat the Afghan Taliban are all signs of this weakened position.

A declaration of withdrawal should have been made only after reaching some level of satisfaction from conferences like the two being held this week. It certainly seems more logical to first assure the scale and scope of transfer of responsibilities to the Afghan security forces before announcing a withdrawal, rather than after.

The surge of troops is an attempt to achieve dominance over the more-hotly contested or no-go areas of Afghanistan, in a, hopefully, short enough period of time for US, to be able to force the Taliban and its allies to the negotiating table. But even if it succeeds, there is an overbearing possibility that such dominance will be momentary, considering the depletion of forces to begin in 2011.

The Taliban are no strangers to suffering casualties and can simply decide to refuse to parley, preferring to wait for a walkover. If they do talk terms, it is likely to be a prelude to a return to pre-October, 2001. What, then, would be the objectives achieved by the US and it’s allies in Afghanistan?

In general terms, will the departure of the US and its allies leave the region safer than before the US invaded Afghanistan? Would al Qaeda be in less of a position to launch terror strikes? Would Pakistan and India be less likely to go to war over terrorism launched from former? Would Pakistan be less or more viable as a functioning state?

Most importantly, would the Afghan people have hope left for a fair go; an even chance?

But if not withdrawal, then what? Pundita has some interesting ideas.

This Tuesday’s expected announcement at the West Point Military Academy of a decision by President Barack Obama on the question of a surge of troops in Afghanistan is going to be keenly examined in Indian strategic circles, especially after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh urged the US President to stay the course in Afghanistan during his visit to the US last week.

But Indian observers will be waiting for more than just an announcement expected to send more US troops to Afghanistan, in numbers widely speculated to fall short of the 40,000 that the US and ISAF Commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal had requested to bolster operations.

There is little question the Indian government shares the concerns of the General when he said recently in a leaked report to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating,” adding, “The long-term fight will require patience and commitment, but I believe the short-term fight will be decisive. Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”

While the outcome of a decision on sending troops and their numbers will be seen as reflective of US commitment to Afghanistan, what will be measured more keenly by India will be indicators from the announcement that could help gauge the meaning President Obama applies to ‘finish the job’ from his earlier statement, “After eight years – some of those years in which we did not have, I think, either the resources or the strategy to get the job done – it is my intention to finish the job.”

The question in the minds of observers and security officials in India will be whether there will be equivalence of meaning and intention between President Obama’s ‘finish the job’ statement and staying the course, as urged by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh when he told the Council on Foreign Relations, “The road to peace on Afghanistan will be long and hard. But given the high stakes involved, the commitment of the international community must be sustained by firm resolve and unity of purpose.”

Officials in New Delhi’s power centers, North and South Block, feel that Afghanistan’s condition is such as to require the sort of long-term commitment that may be greater than what even one US president could be able to completely provide in two terms of office. The feeling here is that bringing Afghanistan to a state where it is able to have a semblance of a civil society and a competent enough armed force to ensure the independence of the government, while at the same time being able to handle an insurgency could possibly take a decade, if not more.

These officials wonder, “Will finishing the job mean merely getting the Afghan security forces up to a grade to secure Kabul and its surroundings for a time, buying off insurgents and buying off Pakistan in an effort to keep Al Qaeda and groups associated with it from exporting terrorism outside Afghanistan and Pakistan?”

One senior official asks, “Afghanistan is not Iraq. A surge may have helped matters there, but will it have any long-term impact in Afghanistan and across the border in Pakistan where the Taliban and Al Qaeda are ready to wait for the US to completely wear out? How long is the US ready to commit its troops?”

But there are also those who predict that US will be compelled to maintain a presence there because of Pakistan. “It looks like it’ll be a long-term presence for the US and ISAF because the Pakistan Army will keep calibrating the levels of conflict in the region. Keeping the US engaged in the area is in Pakistan’s interests. It keeps open the taps of aid, with over $7.5 billion expected to flow in the next five years,” says Brigadier SK Chatterji, recently retired from the Indian Army and one of its long-time psy warriors.

“There has been the idea that Pakistan would like Afghanistan vacated completely to re-establish and consolidate its influence there, install a friendly government and gain its much-vaunted strategic depth against India. However, as of now the greater issue remains US, World Bank, Pak AID Consortium and EU aid. Hence, the continued presence of the ISAF and US forces, perhaps, needs to be ensured. Calibrating the levels of violence in Afghanistan through a Pak-based Afghan Taliban is a very relevant tool of the strategy!” says the Brigadier.

And while the Kashmir issue may be re-conflagrated time and again by the Pakistan Army to, at best, embarrass India, the Brigadier thinks, India needs to debate a status quo solution. “Looking back, I don’t think our Kashmir distraction has helped either us or Pakistan. Our distraction with the issue, and more importantly with Pakistan as a whole, has forced us to be land-centric. We should have started looking towards the oceans a few decades back. Not that the Indian Ocean is our own pond, but our geographical location endows on us the responsibility of ensuring stability in its zone. We’ve lost time there and the Chinese have started making ripples that, with time, could make waves in the Indian Ocean,” he says, adding, “Our distraction with Pakistan has benefited China the most.”

While Indian interest lies with the US actually staying the course and finishing the job as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh would hope, there are also creeping apprehensions of Afghanistan reverting to a pre-9/11 state, if the US were to up and leave before time. “Say if they leave one day, what would happen? There would be a vacuum there. There is no question of either us or the Russian and their Central Asian allies or the Iranians moving in to do anything about it. That leaves the insurgents – the Taliban. This also has security implications for us. Terrorist groups in the region would again get a free pass in the region. And would Taliban and their allies look towards expanding their operations in Pakistan? All of this, when the Pakistani political situation is so unpredictable,” says one senior serving military officer.

With specifically anti-India groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba rivaling Al Qaeda in terms of operational ability and reach, and certainly surpassing it in terms of the impunity with which they operate in Pakistan, this is a matter of some concern to observers in India. The 26/11 attacks on Mumbai and their farcical prosecution in Pakistan, as well as the recent Headley conspiracy revelations have convinced security officials in India of the need to keep the pressure up on Pakistan and resolve the situation in Afghanistan to some reasonable degree of satisfaction. This is why India would like to know whether finishing the job amounts to staying the course.

The commander of US and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal has, in his assessment to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, said that ‘increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions.’

In a much awaited report, the general, expected to bring new thinking and strategies to the Af-Pak theater, has noted Indian influence on Afghanistan and said, “Indian political and economic influence is increasing in Afghanistan, including significant development efforts and financial investment. In addition, the current Afghan government is perceived by Islamabad to be pro-Indian.”

But while the linkage between the growth of Indian influence in Afghanistan and Pakistani retaliation to that has been fairly obvious, in his report to Secretary Gates, General McChrystal confirms the US military belief of the likelihood of Pakistani ‘countermeasures’ in India in reaction to its influence in Afghanistan. This, even while admitting the beneficence of the Indian developmental effort in that country. “While India’s activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India,” says the general.

Even though it is not clear whether the general refers to action by the Pakistani state or by non-state actors against India, it would be safe to assume that the term used, ‘countermeasures’, is general enough to include both.

McChrystal also points the finger at Pakistan. “Afghanistan’s insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan. Senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups are based in Pakistan, are linked with al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups, and are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan’s ISI. Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) based in Pakistan channel foreign fighters, suicide bombers and, technical assistance into Afghanistan, and offer ideological motivation, training, and financial support. Al Qaeda’s links with HQN (Haqqani Network) have grown, suggesting that expanded HQN control could create a favorable environment for AQAM to re-establish safe-havens in Afghanistan. Additionally, the ISAF mission in Afghanistan is reliant on ground supply routes through Pakistan that remain vulnerable to these threats.”

He goes on to say, “Stability in Pakistan is essential, not only in its own right, but also to enable progress in Afghanistan. While the existence of safe havens in Pakistan does not guarantee ISAF failure, Afghanistan does require Pakistani cooperation and action against violent militancy, particularly against those groups active in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the insurgency in Afghanistan is predominantly Afghan.”

The general also warns of Iran and other nations in Central Asia Iran. “Iran plays an ambiguous role in Afghanistan, providing developmental assistance and political support to GIRoA while the Iranian Qods Force is reportedly training fighters for certain Taliban groups and providing other forms of military assistance to insurgents. Iran’s current policies and actions do not pose a short-term threat to the mission, but Iran has the capability to threaten the mission in the future. Pakistan may see Iranian economic and political initiatives as threats to their strategic interests, and may continue to address these issues in ways that are counterproductive to the ISAF effort.”

“Afghanistan’s northern neighbors have enduring interests in, and influence over, particular segments of Afghanistan. They pursue objectives that are not necessarily congruent to ISAF’s mission. ISAF’s Northern Distribution network and logistical hubs are dependent upon support from Russian and Central Asian States, giving them the potential to act as spoilers or positive influences.”

“The stakes in Afghanistan are high,” McChrystal begins his summary, admitting, “The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating.”

McChrystal thinks the next year will likely decide whether the insurgency can be defeated. “The impact of time on our effort in Afghanistan has been underappreciated and we require a new way of thinking about it, he says, adding, “Protecting the population from insurgent coercion and intimidation demands a persistent presence and focus that cannot be interrupted without risking serious setback.”

But he also says, “Second, and more importantly, we face a short and long-term fight. The long-term fight will require patience and commitment, but I believe the short-term fight will be decisive. Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.”

Throughout the assessment, General McChrystal underlines the need for more resources and forces. “Our campaign in Afghanistan has been historically under-resourced and remains so today. Almost every aspect of our collective effort and associated resourcing has lagged a growing insurgency – historically a recipe for failure in COIN. Success will require a discrete “jump” to gain the initiative, demonstrate progress in the short term, and secure long-term support.”

“Resources will not win this war, but under-resourcing could lose it,” he says.

His strategy proposes optimal utilization of assets. “The new strategy will improve effectiveness through better application of existing assets, but it also requires additional resources. Broadly speaking, we require more civilian and military resources, more ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces), and more ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) and other enablers. ”

“Overall, ISAF requires an increase in the total coalition force capability and end-strength. This ‘properly-resourced’ requirement will define the minimum force levels to accomplish the mission with an acceptable level of risk.”

“This is an important — and likely decisive — period of this war. Afghans are frustrated and weary after eight years without evidence of the progress they anticipated. Patience is understandable short, both in Afghanistan and in our own countries. Time matters; we must act now to reverse the negative trends and demonstrate progress.”

McChrystal advocates the need for a new strategy for effective COIN operations. “We cannot succeed simply by trying harder; ISAF must now adopt a fundamentally new approach. The entire culture — how ISAF understands the environment and defines the fight, how it interacts with the Afghan people and government, and how it operates both on the ground and within the coalition — must change profoundly.”

“ISAF requires a properly-resourced force and capability level to correct this deficiency. Success is not ensured by additional forces alone, but continued under-resourcing will likely cause failure.”

“Nonetheless, it must be made clear: new resources are not the crux. To succeed, ISAF requires a new approach – with a significant magnitude of change — in addition to a proper level of resourcing.”

His outline of the proposed strategy, prescribing a change in the operational culture and processes of ISAF, reads, “This assessment prescribes two fundamental changes. First, ISAF must improve execution and the understanding of the basics of COIN — those essential elements common to any counterinsurgency strategy. Second, ISAF requires a new strategy to counter a growing threat. Both of these reforms are required to reverse the negative rends in Afghanistan and achieve success.”

“ISAF is not executing the basics of counterinsurgency warfare,” he says.

General McChrystal’s objective reads, “Accomplishing this mission requires defeating the insurgency, which this paper defines as a condition where the insurgency no longer threatens the viability of the state,” adding, “GIRoA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) must sufficiently control its territory to support regional stability and prevent its use for international terrorism.”

In the assessment, McChrystal has emphasized the need for a new strategy that will require an increase in the size and effectiveness of Afghan security forces. The assessment also indicates the general’s strong belief in the requirement of a population-centric counter-insurgency strategy, where protecting the population, not killing the insurgent is the priority.

The assessment goes on to describe the participants in the conflict. “There are five principal actors in this conflict: the Afghan population, GIRoA, ISAF, the insurgency and the eternal ‘players’. It is important to begin with an understanding of each of these actors, starting with the most important: the people.”

“The people of Afghanistan represent many things in this conflict – an audience, an actor, and a source of leverage — but above all, they are the objective. The population can also be a source of strength and intelligence and provide resistance to the insurgency. Alternatively, they can often change sides and provide tacit or real support to the insurgents. Communities make deliberate choice to resist, support or allow insurgent influence. The reasons for these choices must be better understood.”

“GIRoA and ISAF have both failed to focus on this objective. The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF’s own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government. These problems have alienated large segments of the Afghan population. They do not trust GIRoA to provide their essential needs, such as security, justice, and basic services. This crisis of confidence, coupled with a distinct lack of economic and educational opportunity, has created fertile ground for the insurgency.”

“ISAF’s center of gravity is the will and ability to provide for the needs of the population “by, with and through” the Afghan government. A foreign army alone cannot beat an insurgency; the insurgency in Afghanistan requires an Afghan solution. This is their war and, in the end, ISAF’s competency will prove less decisive than GIRoA’s; eventual success requires capable Afghan governance capabilities and security forces.”

The assessment warns that the battle could go either way. “Either side can succeed in this conflict: GIRoA by securing the support of the people and the insurgents by controlling them. While this multi-faceted model of the fight is centered on the people, it is not symmetrical: the insurgents can also succeed more simply by preventing GIRoA from achieving their goals before the international community becomes exhausted.”

McChrystal identifies the two major challenges to his command and also includes the political challenges of Afghan governance, saying, “The ISAF mission faces two principal threats and is also subject to the influence of external actors.”

“The first threat is the existence of organized and determined insurgent groups working to expel international forces, separate the Afghan people from GIRoA, and gain control of the population.”

“The second threat of a very different kind, is the crisis of popular confidence that springs from the weakness of GIRoA institutions, the unpunished abuse of power by corrupt officials and power-brokers, a widespread sense of political disenfranchisement, and a longstanding lack of economic opportunity. ISAF errors have further compounded the problem. These factors generate recruits for the insurgent groups, elevate local conflicts and power-broker disputes to a national level, degrade the people’s security and quality-of-life, and undermine international will.”

“Addressing the external actors will enable success; however, insufficiently addressing either principal threat will result in failure.”

The general identifies the three main adversaries of ISAF in Afghanistan, saying, ” The major insurgent groups in order of their threat to the mission are: Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), the Haqqani Network (HQN), and the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). The groups coordinate activities loosely, often achieving significant unity of purpose and even some unity of effort, but they do not share a formal command-and-control structure. They also do not have a single overarching strategy of campaign plan. Each individual group, however has a specific strategy, develops annual plans, and allocates resources accordingly. Each group has its own methods of developing and executing these plans and each has adapted over time. Despite the best efforts of GIRoA and ISAF, the insurgents currently have the initiative.”

He goes on to point out the failures of ISAF in Afghanistan and prescribes two strategic measures. “ISAF is not adequately executing the basics of COIN (Counter Insurgency) doctrine. Thus the first major recommendation is to change and focus on that which ISAF has most control of: ISAF. The coalition must hold itself accountable before it can attempt to do so with others.”

“ISAF will change its operating culture pursue a counterinsurgency approach that puts the Afghan people first.”

“ISAF will change the way it does business to improve unity of command within ISAF, seek to improve unity of effort with the international community, and to use resources more effectively.”

For this, what McChrystal says is required is improvement in the understanding of the Afghan people. “ISAF personnel must be seen as guests of the Afghan people and their government, not an occupying army.”

He also advocates building personal relationships and the projection of confidence. “When ISAF forces travel through even the most secure areas of Afghanistan firmly ensconced in armored vehicles with body armor and turrets manned, they convey a sense of high risk and fear to the population. ISAF cannot expect unarmed Afghans to feel secure before heavily armed ISAF forces do. ISAF cannot succeed if it is unwilling to share risk, at least equally, with the people. In fact, once the risk is shared, effective force protection will come from the people, and the overall risk can actually be reduced by operating differently.”

General McChrystal also recommends decentralization of commands and support to the re-integration and reconciliation between the Afghan people, also interestingly advocating economic support to COIN.

“ISAF has an important asymmetrical advantage; it can aid the local economy, along with its civilian counterparts, in ways that the insurgents cannot. Local development can change incentive structures and increase stability in communities. Economic opportunity, especially job-creation, is a critical part of reintegrating the foot-soldier into normal life.”

But he warns that economic support to counterinsurgency is different and cannot be a substitute for long-term development.

In terms of ISAF’s operational structure, he calls for unity of command for the force. “ISAF’s subordinate headquarters must stop fighting separate campaigns,” says the general, who also lists radical increase in partnership, integration and embedding with ANSF, acceleration of the growth of the ANA (Afghan National Army) and transfer of responsibility for long-term detention of detainees to GIRoA, as other changes in ISAF’s strategy.

The new strategy is to consist of three stages. “These stages will unfold at different rates and times in different geographic areas of Afghanistan,” says McChrystal, listing the stages as, gaining the initiative, strategic consolidation and sustained security.

Towards the end, General McChrystal again repeats the need for more forces in Afghanistan. “Proper resourcing will be critical. The campaign in Afghanistan has been historically under-resourced and remains so today – ISAF is operating in a culture of poverty,” he says, adding, “Consequently, ISAF requires more forces.”

McChrystal concludes by saying, “The situation in Afghanistan is serious. The mission can be accomplished, but this will require two fundamental changes. First, ISAF must focus on getting the basics right to achieve a new population-centric operational culture and better unity of effort. Second, ISAF must adopt a new strategy, one that is properly resourced, to radically increase partnership with ANSF, emphasize governance, prioritize resources where the population is threatened, and gain the initiative from the insurgency. This will entail significant near-term cost and risk; however, the long-term risk of not executing this strategy is greater. The U.S. Strategy and NATO mission for Afghanistan both call for a committed and comprehensive approach to the strategic threat of an insecure and unstable Afghanistan through proper resourcing, rigorous implementation, and sustained political will, this refocused strategy offers ISAF the best prospect for success in this important mission.

The casualties suffered by the British Army in Afghanistan and the subsequent furor in London over insufficient deployment of men and materiel to support the British mission in Afghanistan have led many commentators in the United Kingdom (UK) to question the mission and its objectives.

There is a feeling that the lack of a good definition of success for the British Army in Afghanistan has led to ‘mission-creep’, with some commentators even calling the current mission one with the objective of propping up a corrupt, inefficient, faction-ridden and drug-trading regime and providing security for an election that is apprehended to be ridden with irregularities.

On the other hand Major General Athar Abbas, Director General of Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations admitted to CNN that the Pakistan military is in contact with Taliban leader Mullah Omar and can facilitate a peace dialogue between the Taliban in return for concessions from Washington with respect to India.

Last week again, the Chief of General Staff (CGS) of the Afghan National Army (ANA) General Bismillah Khan Mohammadi was in New Delhi on a four-day visit. The official statement of the Indian Army said:

India shares warm and friendly relations with Afghanistan based on historical ties and traditional linkages. India supports a sovereign, stable, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan and is committed to building strategic partnership in all dimensions to this effect. With this commitment regular exchange of visits at political, diplomatic and military level have taken place in the last few years. During the visit he is likely to interact with senior military and civilian defence hierarchy to discuss various contemporary issues.

Speculation had been rife about the possibility of an Afghan request, especially after the visit of General Mohammadi, for increased Indian Army involvement in Afghanistan, with even General Abbas in his interview with CNN apprehending such an eventuality, saying, “What we see as a concern is an over-involvement of Indians in Afghanistan that becomes a concern – particularly if one is watching the security calculus in that.”

General Abbas said, “The fear is, tomorrow what happens if these Americans move out and they are replaced by Indians as military trainers? That becomes a serious concern. So these kind of apprehensions are there, and they are talked about and they are consulted.”

He said Pakistan has been informing the US-led coalition countries about its concerns. “They have to have a line because if [it] goes beyond them, beyond the line then of course the situation would take an ugly turn,” he warned.

With the British Army under pressure in Afghanistan and the US, already in the process of implementing a surge there with no additional troop deployment planned this year, an Indian Army deployment would not be entirely unwelcome to the US and British forces in Afghanistan. It is also not as if the Indian Army has not thought along these lines. In fact, the 18 Infantry Division (RAPID) of the X Corps of the Indian Army has already been earmarked for this eventuality, should it arise. But there are problems with geopolitics, logistics, finance and Indian Army strength levels. Your correspondent spoke to a senior member of the Indian security establishment in the Indian government to get an idea of the discussion on this issue.

“India would be uncomfortable operating without the UN flag. This is also the reason India did not join the international naval task force against piracy in the Arabian Sea and Red Sea, CTF (Combined Task Force)-150. The MEA (Ministry of External Affairs) too might consider it too adventurous,” says the officer.

“Joining up with a NATO/ISAF or non-NATO/ISAF US mission in Afghanistan would be politically problematic in India,” he explains, adding, “But ideally, if India wants to be recognized as a Great Power, it should be able to shoulder the responsibilities of a Great Power, without needing the umbrella of the UN.”

The brasshat, who prefers anonymity, goes on, “Then you have international reaction. For a Pakistan that has trust issues with India, this would be a strategic encirclement. Pakistan would find it far more difficult to direct terrorism against India with impunity and without fear of punitive measures, its nuclear weapons notwithstanding. Needless to say, Pakistan would be terribly unhappy about the idea of Indian forces on both sides, as has come out in the remarks made by General Abbas.”

According to him, it is open to question whether the US would be able to persuade Pakistan on this issue. “And the pound of flesh demanded by Pakistan from the US for this would be best left to the imagination,” he says. But the initial demand would almost certainly be focused towards India and would probably be one with which India would refuse to acquiesce. “Perhaps – and this is a long shot – an offer of more aid from the US would persuade the Pakistani generals,” he shrugs.

Logistics would be an even bigger problem for India than it is for the US. Even if Pakistan were to agree to the basic idea, it would be extremely unlikely for them to allow the transit of men and materiel through their territory into Afghanistan, the main supply route. It should also be noted that this route is extremely vulnerable to attack by Taliban as has been seen by the numerous attacks on key bridges and US supplies.

“In theory, we could request Iran for a transit route, shipping materiel to Bandar Abbas port in the Persian Gulf and then by road to the Afghan border at Zaranj and on to Delaram and then the Afghan Ring Road. As it is this Zaranj-Delaram road was built by our Border Roads Organization (BRO) for the strategic purpose of establishing a supply route to Afghanistan that was not dependent on Pakistan,” he explains, but points to more hurdles to come.

“Say we get the transit rights. It would take a huge financial outlay to supply our troops. How many troops are we talking about here? As of April this year, the US-led coalition had around 100,000 troops. Of course the surge of 17,000 troops is being implemented now. This is besides almost 100,000 in the ANA and Afghan police. The Soviets had a bit more than a 100,000 troops during the ’80s with the Afghan army matching that number. If the proposal is, as General Abbas apprehends, it would be a long-term mission and could result in us having to send in far more troops than we originally thought of deploying. And then we would also have to keep force levels up back home as well and may have to raise additional divisions.”

In the end, he says, “Sure we’d be only too happy to be there. Not only would this be ideal after 26/11, it would also give us a strategic advantage in dealing with Pakistan. India is generally well-liked in Afghanistan and we have extensive experience in COIN (Counter Insurgency) Ops (Operations) so we could do it if we deploy there. The emphasis needs to be on building up the institutions of the Afghan army and police to maybe four to five times their current strength. Proper training and equipment has to be given to them and they have be to built up into a cohesive force so that they become capable of handling the COIN Ops themselves. Of course, the US-led forces have tried to do that, but with limited success, because of the corruption and factionalism in the Afghan government.”

The US is perceived to be trying to ‘finish the job’ in Afghanistan and leave in 2-5 years time. The British too are under pressure to withdraw from the conflict there. “They could well leave, but Al Qaeda and the Taliban will probably become a bigger threat. The British need to rethink their recent cheering of the Pakistan Army’s defeat of the Taliban in Swat. There is no cause for satisfaction yet. Let’s see what happens after the Afghan presidential elections next month,” says the officer.

Reports suggesting the US now considers terrorist group Lashkar-e-Toiba to have gained a stature to rival Al Qaeda are being viewed as confirming the views of Indian Intelligence about dangers posed by this group, a stand India has long advocated. While earlier the Lashkar was never taken as seriously as Al Qaeda by the west, after the 26/11 attacks western intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies have been jolted out of their complacency.

“After 26/11, US Intelligence agencies have started looking at Laskhar assets within the US itself, both in terms of a money trail as well as a threat to US homeland security as well,” says one source in the Indian security establishment, adding “Lashkar is now being considered enough of a threat to merit as much attention by the west as was Al Qaeda.”

“But Lashkar is also in some ways, more of a threat than Al Qaeda. Lashkar has had mainstream appeal and a front organization in Jammat ud Dawa in Pakistan. It can mobilize support from their target masses like Hamas in Palestine in a way trhat Al Qaeda cannot. Also, Al Qaeda’s area where it can operate freely without fear of punitive action has reduced greatly in the past few years. That is not the case with Lashkar, which has remained free to operate publicly in Pakistan. Lashkar has a wide network and has been openly funded by financiers in the Middle East, while Al Qaeda’s money supply is no longer so open,” explains the source.

“But it is good that at least at this stage the west has woken up to the danger of Lashkar. They are as much a danger to the west as they are to India. The alert at the New York subway after 26/11 actually resulted from a threat perception on the basis of intelligence reports point to an attack by the Lashkar. So it is good that the west has also become serious about dealing with Lashkar,” the source added.