The planned offensive against Naxals in the next few months has been a long time coming and is finally a sign of the government taking the problem seriously. But a COIN expert spoke to StratPost and advised caution and calculation, to prevent the operation from becoming counter-productive.
“We probably had this round for no reason other than that it was scheduled. Otherwise this is hardly a good time to talk to China and get something substantial out of the process. There are just too many issues between us,” said one brasshat.
The Indian Army has catered for the contingency by earmarking the 18 Infantry Division (RAPID) of the X Corps for deployment if the need arises. But there are problems with geopolitics, logistics, finance and Indian Army strength levels.
‘Merely promising prosecution of some of those involved in 26/11 is not going to get us all holding hands and singing Kumbaya in a church choir.’
The issue of the creation of a Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) for the Indian armed forces is one who’s fate has been the hostage of usually reluctant government discussions and opposition from various quarters. StratPost analyzes this opposition to a CDS that has so far precluded jointsmanship and strategic planning.
“It’s too early to conclusively say the Taliban have changed their strategy and expanded the conflict to PoK. But while one attack doesn’t necessarily make a strategy, it (the frontline) has definitely been extended, and in such a way as to strike at the Pakistan Army out of the existing area of conflict.”
The operational capability of the Pakistan Army in the face of Taliban challenges in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has much to do with the command authority of its officer cadre. But judging from recent events and the perception of the integrity of the officer cadre, especially at senior levels, the Pakistan Army fails to encourage confidence in its abilities to effectively combat the Taliban.
A report issued by the US National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) on Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threats has put in perspective the range of Chinese, Indian and Pakistani capabilities in this regard.StratPost publishes extracts from the report.
“The US has to transmit an effective message that they are here to stay till the local population can defend itself. These messages need to be tailored very carefully for maximum impact, understanding and acceptance.”
It is safe to assume that this lack of infrastructural parity on both sides of the border would give China a natural military advantage over India. It is important to recall, it was due to India’s abysmal border infrastructure, poor intelligence and shortage in military supplies, besides possibly flawed political and military leadership that enabled Mao’s China to thrash India in the India-China war of 1961. So in the event of a repeat conflict over the eastern borders could India move strategically to choke Chinese maritime movement of strategic supplies, especially petroleum?
